

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BANGKO 23544 01 OF 02 161114Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----105952 161119Z/11

P 161027Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9540

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 23544

EXDIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PEPR  
SUBJ: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER

1. ACCCOMPANIED BY DCM, I PAID MY FIRST FORMAL CALL ON PRIME MINISTER KRIANGSAK ON AUGUST 15. THE PM HAD SANDWICCHED ME IN BETWEEN BEGINNING ROUND OF FAREWELL VISITS TO THE TROOPS IN THE FIELD.

2. AFTER A RATHER LAVISH EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES AND WELCOMING, I TOLD THE PM I CAME TO PAY MY RESPECTS AND THAT I WANTED TO ONLY RAISE A FEW SUBJECTS WITH HIM AT THIS TIME. I OPENED BY INDICATING THAT I COULD ATTEST PERSONALLY TO THE RESEPCT FOR HIM IN THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AS WELL AS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. WE ALL APPLAUD HIS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDOCHINESE STATES AND CHINA AND WE CERTAINLY APPRECIATED HIS PERSONAL EFFORTS IN THE NARCOTICS FIELD AND ON BEHALF OF THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEES. HE SAID HE APPRECAITED MY REMARKS AND THAT THE THREE POINTS I HAD MENTIONED WERE KEY TO HIM. HE SAID HE HAD DEVOTED MUCH TIME TO THE THAI NARCOTICS PROGRAM, BUT HE STILL WAS DISSATISFIED WITH THAILAND'S ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AND FELT THAT MORE COULD BE DONE. HE WAS DISMAYED AT THE GROWTH OF THAILAND'S ADDICT POPULATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BANGKO 23544 01 OF 02 161114Z

3. TRIP TO U.S. - THE PM SAID THAT HE WAS EAGER TO TAKE UP THE INVITATION TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. HE WANTED TO VISIT AT A TIME SUFFICIENTLY BEFORE THE ELECTION, WHICH HE SAID WOULD TAKE PLACE SOMETIME IN MARCH. HE ALSO WANTED IT TO BE A VERY QUICK VISIT, SINCE HE FELT HE COULD NOT DALLY ABROAD TOO LONG FOR FEAR OF CRITICISM.

MOREOVER, HE HAD OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS  
AT HOME.

4. I ASKED HIM WHAT WOULD BE THE BEST TIME FOR HIM. HE  
SAID HE COULD NOT GO BEFORE DECEMBER AND THAT HE WOULD  
HAVE TO COME AT LEAST A MONTH BEFORE THE ELECTION TO PERMIT  
HIMSELF SUFFICIENT TIME TO MANAGE HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES  
IN THAILAND. THE BEST TIME FOR HIM WOULD BE EARLY JANUARY  
BUT HE COULD DO IT ANY TIME BETWEEN LATE DECEMBER AND  
THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF FEBRUARY. THE MORE TIME BETWEEN THE  
VISIT AND THE ELECTION, THE EASIER IT WOULD BE FOR HIM.  
HE SAID THE JAPANESE HAD INVITED HIM IN JANUARY; FUKUDA  
WANTED TO DO SOMETHING "BIG" FOR HIM. I SAID HIS VISIT  
WAS IMPORTANT TO US, THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS PREFERENCES  
BACK TO WASHINGTON, THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD BE  
SUITABLE GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S BUSY SCHEDULE, AND THAT I  
WOULD BE BACK TO HIM WHEN I HAD AN INDICATION OF WHAT  
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

5. ASEAN - FROM THE REPORTS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM UPPADIT  
THE PM THOUGHT THE WASHINGTON MEETING WENT VERY WELL.  
HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE ATTENTION THE U.S. HAD PUT ON  
ASEAN AND THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A POLITICALLY IMPORTANT  
FACT FOR ASIA. HE FELT THAT TANGIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS WERE  
MODEST. I SAID I THOUGHT THE MEETING HAD BOTH AN IMPORTANT  
SYMBOLIC IMPACT AND VERY USEFUL SPECIFIC RESULTS. IN THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BANGKO 23544 01 OF 02 161114Z

CASE OF THE FORMER, IT WAS, AS HE SAID, NOT ONLY A CLEAR  
INDICATION OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ASEAN, BUT IT WAS ALSO  
POLITICALLY IMPORTANT IN THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF  
GENERATING GREATER PUBLIC INTEREST IN ASIA AND HELPING  
ESTABLISH BETTER PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AN APPROPRIATE AND  
CONSTRUCTIVE U.S. ROLE IN THE AREA. I SAID THE TANGIBLE  
RESULTS WERE ALSO SIGNIFICANT. I POINTED TO THE COMMITMENT  
TO PURSUE THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMMON FUND AND IN THE  
CASE OF THAILAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VISITS OF EXIM  
BANK CHAIRMAN MOORE AND THE OPIC SPONSORED GROUP HEADED  
BY CHARLES ROBINSON. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT ROBINSON WAS  
A FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE AND THAT THE VISITS  
COULD POTENTIALLY HAVE A MAJOR CATALYTIC EFFECT ON U.S.  
INVESTMENT IN THAILAND. THIS SPARKED THE PM'S INTEREST.  
HE SAID FOREIGN INVESTMENT WAS CRUCIAL TO HIS EFFORTS AND  
HE WANTED TO KNOW WHEN THE GROUP WOULD COME. I SAID SOME-  
TIME IN NOVEMBER. HE HOPED IT WOULD NOT BE DURING TENG  
HSIAO-PING'S VISIT, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN SCHEDULED BETWEEN  
NOVEMBER 4-9, (HE CAUTIONED THAT THE DATES HAD NOT YET  
BEEN MADE PUBLIC).

6. U.S.-THAI RELATIONS - THE PM THEN WENT INTO A LONG

SOLILOQUY ON THAILAND'S SOLITARY POSITION AND THE LACK OF SUPPORT THAT HE WAS GETTING FROM THE U.S., COMPARING IT TO THE COMPLETE SUPPORT VIETNAM WAS GETTING FROM THE SOVIET UNION. HE WAS PARTICULARLY BITTER ABOUT OUR MILITARY SUPPLY POLICIES, SAYING THAT THE CEILING WAS CUTTING OUT SMALL COUNTRIES LIKE HIS SO THAT MIDEAST COUNTRIES COULD BE TAKEN CARE OF, AND THAT WE WERE INSUFFICIENTLY INSENSITIVE TO THAILAND'S DEFENSE NEEDS. HE HAD TO GO TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR EQUIPMENT. HE

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 BANGKO 23544 02 OF 02 161116Z  
ACTION SS-25

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-----105971 161119Z/23  
P 161027Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9541

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BANGKOK 23544

EXDIS

CLAIMED THAT WE WERE NOT WILLING TO SELL HIM IN A TIMELY FASHION EVEN BASIC ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS THE M-79. THE LEVEL OF CREDITS WE WERE OFFERING WERE MINIMAL, AND HE DIDN'T SEE WHY THE U.S., WHICH HAD BEEN SO CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THAILAND, WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND THUS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WHEREWITHAL THE PEOPLE AND THE MILITARY NEEDED. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY HAD DETERIORATED, BUT ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR POLITICAL STABILITY.

7. I CHOSE NOT TO ARGUE WITH HIM ON THIS OCCASION BUT MERELY STATED THE U.S. WAS STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THAILAND, THAT WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT PROGRAMS HERE, THAT WE HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, RAISED THE SIZE OF OUR AID EFFORTS\* AND THAT WHILE WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO MEET ALL OF THAILAND'S EQUIPMENT REQUESTS, NO ONE CAN DOUBT THAT WE ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THAI EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND DEVELOP THEIR COUNTRY. I SAID I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE M-79 PROBLEM BUT WOULD LOOK INTO IT. THE PM NODDED AND SAID THAT THE NEXT FIVE YEARS WERE CRUCIAL FOR HIS COUNTRY, THAT CONTINUED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS ESSENTIAL AND THAT

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONFIDENCE WAS THE KEY, AND THAT HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT LET THAILAND GO DOWN FOR SMALL AMOUNTS OF MONEY OR ARMS.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 BANGKO 23544 02 OF 02 161116Z

8. I TOLD THE PM THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER SUBJECTS I WANT TO RAISE WITH HIM PRIVATELY, BUT DID NOT WANT TO DO SO BECAUSE I KNEW HOW BUSY HIS SCHEDULE WAS TODAY. HE SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THEM EARLY ON AT HIS HOUSE OVER DINNER.

9. COMMENTS FOLLOW BY SEPTEL. ABRAMOWITZ

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## Message Attributes

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